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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS' INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 67-19-14.2(l)(b) is NOT PLAUSIBLE. 
Plaintiffs' entire argument hinges on the inexplicable assertion that an employee 
"is eligible to receive retirement benefits" as soon as he commences full-time 
employment with the State. In Plaintiffs' view, a twenty-year old employee who has 
worked for the State for one day, and who may never accrue the necessary service credit 
to actually retire, is somehow immediately "eligible to receive retirement benefits." On 
the basis of this overreaching claim, Plaintiffs' conclude that "eligible to receive 
retirement benefits" must mean the same thing as "eligible to accrue service credit, and 
thus participate in a retirement system"—an equivalency that is nowhere in Section 14.2 
or Title 49.{ 
Plaintiffs expend great effort explaining that an employee is eligible to "accrue 
service credit" under Title 49 as soon as he begins full-time employment. While true, that 
is not the issue. The question is not when an employee is eligible "to receive service 
credit," but rather when he is eligible "to receive retirement benefits." "Service credit" is 
not a retirement benefit. An employee may have accrued years of service credit but be 
ineligible to receive anything upon retirement. Section 14.2(l)(b) mandates that the 
Program may only be offered to an employee who "is eligible to receive retirement 
benefits" under Title 49—it does not say employees who "might one day be eligible to 
1
 For purposes of this analysis, it must be kept in mind that Title 49 covers all 
public employees in the State, including, for example, municipal employees, while Title 
67 covers only State employees. 
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receive retirement benefits, assuming they accrue enough service credit;" it does not say 
employees who are "eligible to participate in the system and receive service credit;" and it 
does not say, as Plaintiffs contend, "all regular, full-time employees." 
Had the Legislature wanted to expand the scope of Section 14.2 to include all 
regular full-time employees, it easily could have done so. Plaintiffs' interpretation 
ignores the limiting language actually used in Section 14.2 and requires this Court to 
"redraft the provision, inserting language that the legislature did not and removing 
language that the legislature selected[.]" Smith v. Price Dev. Co., 2005 UT 87, f 23, 125 
P.3d 945. This Court should decline that improper invitation. See Green River Canal Co. 
v. Olds, 2004 UT 106, f 18, 110 P.3d 666 ("[I]t is improper to 'infer substantive terms 
into the text that are not already there. Rather, [statutory] interpretation must be based on 
the language used, and the court has no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an 
intention not expressed.'" (citation omitted)). 
Aside from its facial implausibility and the strained reading it gives to the actual 
words used in Section 14.2, Plaintiffs' interpretation is implausible for at least four 
specific reasons. 
First, Plaintiffs' interpretation of the phrase "retirement benefits" is inconsistent 
with the specific language and statutory scheme of Title 49. Plaintiffs assert that Title 49 
does not deal with the concept of "retirement benefits," but rather, only the terms "service 
credit" and "allowance." Appellants' Supp. Brief at 5. Plaintiffs then argue that "eligible 
to receive retirement benefits" should be interpreted to mean "eligible to accrue service 
I66171v4 2 
credit and participate in the system/' which happens at the commencement of regular, 
full-time employment, rather than "eligible to receive an allowance," which happens only 
upon actual retirement. By arguing that an "allowance" is not a "retirement benefit" 
under Title 49, but that "service credit" is, Plaintiffs turn Title 49 on its head. 
Service credit, by itself, is not any kind of retirement benefit; it is merely a way to 
track how long an employee has been working for the State and when, coupled with age 
and/or years of service, he may become eligible for retirement. See Utah Code Ann. § 49-
12-401(1 )(c); § 49-13-401(1 )(c); see also id § 49-11-401(3)(c) (specifying guidelines for 
how much service credit "shall be credited towards qualification for retirement"); cf. id 
§ 49-11-405(1 )(a), (2) (allowing an employee to "combine service credit for purposes of 
determining eligibility for retirement" and referencing "the minimum amount of service 
credit required to retire from the system"). A service credit is simply one element, along 
with leaving employment and submitting the proper paperwork, that makes one eligible to 
receive retirement benefits. 
Plaintiffs are also incorrect in asserting that Title 49 does not speak in terms of 
"benefits." That term is used repeatedly throughout Title 49 as interchangeable with the 
retirement term "allowance."2 Indeed, this Court recently used the phrase "retirement 
2
 See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-12-402(2) (the "Option One benefit is an annual 
allowance . . ."); 49-12-405, (4) (referring to Option Three allowance as "[s]ervice 
retirement benefits" and stating that "benefits payable under this section are retirement 
benefits . . ."); 49-11-40l(3)(b) ("[a]n allowance or other benefit. . ."); 49-11-405(3) 
(referring to "member's allowance" as "benefit"); 49-1 l-504(4)(d) (referring to revised 
allowance as "recalculated benefit"); 49-11-611(2) ("[a]n allowance or other 
benefit. . ."); 49-12-60l(5)(b) (using terms interchangeably); 49-12-701 (referring to 
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benefits" to describe a Title 49 allowance throughout its opinion in Thompson v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 2004 UT 107, 112 P.3d 1205. This is hardly surprising, since an 
allowance (unlike service credit) actually constitutes money paid to a retired employee, 
i.e., a retirement benefit? As between service credit and the retirement allowance, there is 
no question which one is consistent with the natural meaning of "retirement benefit." 
Plaintiffs' interpretation concludes otherwise, and is therefore implausible. 
Second, Plaintiffs' interpretation of the phrase "is eligible" is inconsistent with the 
natural and common-sense meaning of those terms. An employee is not eligible for a 
benefit if he has no present entitlement and his receipt of that benefit depends on future 
events that may never occur. Plaintiffs' assertion that an unretired employee "is eligible 
to receive retirement benefits" is akin to claiming that an infant "is eligible to receive 
Social Security benefits" because he might one day turn sixty-five. Such an interpretation 
ignores the fact that the Legislature used the present tense of the verb "is" as opposed to 
the future tense "will be," and requires improperly reading the substantive word 
"eventually" between the words "to" and "receive". Such a sweeping expansion of the 
calculation of allowance as "calculation of benefit"); 49-13-402(2) ("The Option One 
benefit is an allowance . . ."); 49-13-405(3) (using terms interchangeably); 49-16-201(4) 
("[a]n allowance or other benefit..."); 49-16-602(11) ("[disability retirement benefits 
shall be considered an allowance . . ."), 
3
 There are two other types of "benefits" paid to employees under Title 49: death 
benefits (payable "upon the death of a retiree"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-12-404(1), 49-12-
501, 49-13-404, 49-13-501; and disability benefits (payable only upon retirement for 
disability), id. § 49-12-601. These benefits also do not support Plaintiffs' interpretation 
because an employee must die or become disabled and retire before he is eligible to 
receive them. Like the retirement allowance, they are not available on the first day an 
employee begins work. 
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scope of Section 14.2 is unwarranted, particularly when it contradicts the express 
statutory language.4 
Third, Plaintiffs' interpretation that only "members" are eligible to receive 
retirement benefits leads to an absurd interpretation of Section 14.2. As Plaintiffs 
recognize, the definition of "member" in Title 49 specifically excludes retirees. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 49-11-102(22), (23). Yet Plaintiffs contend that an employee is "eligible to 
receive retirement benefits" only if he "meets the eligibility requirements for membership 
in a system," i.e., is a regular, full-time employee accruing service credit. Appellants' 
Supp. Brief at 5-7. Employees who have already retired cannot meet Plaintiffs' eligibility 
requirement because they are not "members" and no longer are eligible to accrue service 
credit. Thus, if Plaintiffs' interpretation were correct, it would lead to the absurd 
conclusion that retired employees are not "eligible to receive retirement benefits " under 
Title 49. That interpretation would certainly come as a surprise to the State's retirees, and 
is implausible, to say the leasts 
4
 If the Legislature had wanted to expressly provide that accrued sick leave was an 
immediately vested right, which would then allow it to be cashed in before retirement, it 
knew how to do so. Annual leave, for example, is vested to a State employee upon 
accrual. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12.7(2) ("[AJnnual leave . . . shall be converted 
into the employee's deferred compensation account at the employee's pay rate at the time 
of termination or retirement" (emphasis added)). This provision stands in stark contrast 
to Section 14.2, which contains no such language, as well as to the rules prohibiting 
compensation for accrued sick leave for employees that terminate their employment short 
of retirement. See Utah Admin. Code r.477-7-4(8) ("An employee separating from state 
service may not receive compensation for accrued unused sick leave unless retiring" 
(emphasis added)). 
5
 The fact that retirees may previously have been "members" that were "eligible to 
participate in a system" is immaterial, since the question is who "is eligible" to receive 
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Fourth, and finally, Plaintiffs' interpretation is contrary to the way this Court has 
itself construed eligibility for retirement benefits under Title 49. In Cannon v. McDonald, 
615 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1980), this Court addressed the claims of two former legislators who 
sought to receive legislative pensions based on alleged service credit under Title 49. In 
concluding that the legislators did not qualify for Title 49 benefits because they did not 
have the necessary service credit, this Court used language that is impossible to square 
with Plaintiffs'interpretation of Title 49: 
Before a past legislator can become eligible for retirement benefits under 
[Section 49-10-36], he must have accumulated four or more years of prior 
service credit. Because "prior service credit" is defined in 49-10-17 with 
reference to the original retirement act, the plaintiffs' eligibility for benefits 
depends upon fulfillment of the requirements of those provisions. 
Id. at 1271 (emphasis added).6 
This Court did not conclude, as Plaintiffs urge, that eligibility for retirement 
benefits occurs whenever an employee begins to accrue service credit; rather, eligibility 
depends on the fulfillment of all conditions precedent, including accumulation of all 
required service credit and any other "requirements of those provisions." Id. In terms of 
public employees, Sections 49-12-401 and 49-13-401 unambiguously require three 
conditions precedent before an employee is eligible to receive a retirement allowance: (1) 
retirement benefits. Any interpretation that excludes retirees from this definition, as 
Plaintiffs' interpretation does, is obviously incorrect. 
6
 The same conclusion was reached in Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Board, 151 
P.2d 882 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), affirmed by this Court, 783 P.2d 540 (Utah 1989), in 
which the court of appeals concluded that the plaintiff was "not entitled to benefits under 
the governing Disability Act" because "he failed to satisfy the conditions precedent" to 
receiving those benefits. 757 P,2d at 886 (emphasis added). 
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ceasing actual work; (2) filing necessary paperwork; and (3) accruing the necessary 
combination of service credit and/or age.7 Utah Code Ann. § 49-12-401(1); § 49-13-
401(1); see also id. § 49-11-102(35) (only "retirees" are eligible for "an allowance under 
this title"). Plaintiffs' interpretation renders these requirements meaningless, and is 
therefore implausible. 
Plaintiffs offer only two reasons why they believe the State's interpretation is 
implausible. Neither is persuasive. First, Plaintiffs claim that the State's interpretation 
would undermine the "purpose" of the Program as an incentive to reduce sick leave 
abuse, apparently because nothing short of a binding contractual guarantee would provide 
an incentive to employees. That misguided assertion is addressed at length in Section 
II.B, infra. Suffice it to say that Plaintiffs' views about what may be necessary to 
incentivize employees cannot have the effect of re-writing the plain language of Section 
14.2. It is the role of the Legislature to make policy judgments about how best to 
effectuate the purpose of its laws. If Plaintiffs believe that nothing short of a contractual 
guarantee will effectively reduce sick leave abuse, they should direct that policy argument 
to the Legislature, not seek to amend the statute by judicial fiat. 
Second, Plaintiffs assert that the State's interpretation renders the word "offer" 
meaningless because no contractual offer can be made at retirement. That assertion 
makes no sense. The Program provides a statutory option that may be offered to an 
7
 Actual retirement was not an issue in Cannon because both legislators had long 
since retired. Cannon, 615 P.2d at 1269. 
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employee at the time he becomes eligible to receive retirement benefits. It is not 
mandatory for an agency or an employee, and thus the word "offer" correctly describes 
the Program. The employee accepts the offer by agreeing at the time of retirement to 
participate in the Program and relies by exchanging her sick leave in the way she elects 
under the statute. Plaintiffs' implicit assumption that the use of the word "offer" 
somehow compels the creation of a pre-retirement contract is unsupported by the statutory 
language and is contrary to the presumption against creating contractual rights by statute. 
See, e.g., R.L Laborers' DisL Council v. R.L, 145 F.3d 42, 44 (1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting 
argument that statute created contract for employee benefits based on use of word 
"offer"). Moreover, the critical question is not whether a vested contract right is created 
in the abstract; it is whether that right arises prior to retirement Both Section 14.2 and 
Title 49 make clear that it does not. 
The State's interpretation of Section 14.2 offers the only way to harmonize Section 
14.2 with the unambiguous requirements of Title 49. There is no question that an 
employee immediately becomes eligible to accrue service credit when he begins regular, 
full-time employment for the State. But merely being eligible for service credit does not 
mean that an employee is eligible to receive retirement benefits. To meet that second 
threshold, he must accrue a sufficient amount of service credit, reach a particular age, 
cease his employment, and complete the necessary retirement procedures. "[T]o merit 
consideration as an interpretation that creates an ambiguity, the alternative rendition must 
be based upon the usual and natural meaning of the language used and may not be the 
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result or a forced of strained construction/' Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 1, ^  17, 
P.3d (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiffs' interpretation fails this requirement 
and should be rejected by this Court. 
II. SECONDARY LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A CONTRACT 
WITH CURRENT EMPLOYEES UNDER SECTION 14.2. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the language of Section 14.2 were ambiguous, the 
governing canon of statutory construction in this case not only prohibits this Court from 
looking beyond the plain language of the statute to discern its ''legislative intent," but also 
mandates that any facial ambiguity be resolved against the creation of a contract. 
Moreover, even if the consideration of secondary evidence were appropriate, Plaintiffs 
have not identified any such evidence that clearly and unequivocally expresses a 
legislative intent to create any contract, much less the expansive and detailed contract to 
which Plaintiffs seek to irrevocably bind the State. Indeed, virtually all of the purported 
"legislative history" cited by Plaintiffs consists of statements made by individual 
legislators prior to 2004, when the relevant statutes did not allow the first 25% of accrued 
sick leave to be exchanged for health insurance. Even if such isolated statements were 
relevant (which they are not), they provide no support to Plaintiffs' claims. 
A. If Section 14.2 Were Ambiguous, Well-Established Principles of 
Statutory Construction Would Require this Court to Construe the 
Ambiguity Against Creating a Contract. 
Throughout their brief, Plaintiffs wholly ignore the fundamental canon of statutory 
construction that a legislative enactment cannot give rise to a contract unless there is first 
a clear and unequivocal indication that the legislature intended to bind itself in a 
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contractual manner. See Nat'I R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co., 470 U.S. 451, 465-66 (1985); see also United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 
874-75 (1996) (explaining that because "nothing can be taken against the State by 
presumption or inference," a surrender of legislative authority must be expressed "in 
terms too plain to be mistaken" (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added)). As the 
State has previously explained, to hold otherwise would "'play havoc with . . . the 
fundamental legislative prerogative to reserve to itself the implicit power of statutory 
amendment and modification.'" Retired Adjunct Professors of the State ofR.L v. Almond, 
690 A.2d 1342, 1346 (R.I. 1997) (quoting Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d 803, 808 
(Conn. 1985)). For a statute to unambiguously express a legislative intent to create a 
contract, it must be apparent from the language of the statute itself. See Studier v. Mich. 
Pub. Sck Employees' Ret. Bd, 698 N.W.2d 350, 362 (Mich. 2005); Fed'n of Parole & 
Prob. Officers v. Or., 928 P.2d 335, 338 (Or. Ct. App. 1996). "Resort to the legislative 
history to root out some latent legislative purpose is inappropriate." Fed'n of Parole & 
Prob. Officers, 928 P.2d at 338. 
This Court has asked the parties to presume that the statute is ambiguous because 
both the State's interpretation and Plaintiffs' interpretation are plausible. But if that is the 
case, Plaintiffs cannot prevail. In Federation of Parole & Probation Officers, for 
example, the plaintiffs challenged the legislature's enactment of a statute that, plaintiffs 
claimed, violated certain job protection rights contained in other statutes. The court 
recognized, and the defendant conceded, that both plaintiffs' and defendant's 
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interpretation of the relevant statutes were plausible. Noting the statutory cannon of 
construction that "a contract will not be inferred from any legislation unless that 
legislation 'unambiguously expresses an intention to create a contract,'" id at 338 
(citation omitted), the court rejected plaintiffs' contract claim, stating as follows: 
Because both plaintiffs' and the state's interpretations of [the statute] are 
plausible, the statute does not unambiguously express an intention to create 
a contract. Thus, [the statute] does not create a contract [and] plaintiffs 
have no statutory contract rights subject to impairment by [the amended 
statute]. 
Id. at 339 (footnotes omitted). 
The same result governs here. This Court's assumption that the statute is 
ambiguous leads inevitably to the conclusion that the statute does not give rise to a 
contract. Plaintiffs' claims accordingly fail. See id. 
B. Section 14.2's Purported "Legislative Intent" Does Not Clearly and 
Unequivocally Express an Intent to Bind the State to a Contract with 
Current Employees, 
Even assuming that it were appropriate to delve into the legislative history of the 
statute and examine other secondary considerations in an effort to unearth some clear and 
unequivocal expression of legislative intent not apparent from the plain language of the 
statute itself, Plaintiffs fail to identify any evidence that would demonstrate the statute 
was unmistakably intended to create a binding and irrevocable contract between the State 
and current employees. Plaintiffs' argument is based almost entirely on the statements of 
individual legislators in debates prior to 2004, when the statutes at issue did not allow 
employees to exchange the first 25% of their sick leave for health insurance. Even if 
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these isolated statements were a good indicator of legislative purpose (which they are 
not), they are irrelevant to Plaintiffs' claims here. 
Plaintiffs' basic argument is that, over the years, many legislators expressed their 
views that Section 14.2 was enacted to provide an incentive to curb sick leave abuse. See, 
e.g., Appellants' Supp. Brief at 4, 10, 20-21. Based solely on that premise, Plaintiffs 
make the inferential leap that the Legislature must, therefore, have intended to provide an 
immediately vested contractual guarantee allowing an employee to use the full 100% of 
unused sick leave for health insurance. This argument is fundamentally flawed and 
should be rejected for at least five reasons. 
First, Plaintiffs' heavy reliance on statements of individual legislators prior to 2004 
is inexplicable, since during all of the debates Plaintiffs cite, the statutory "incentive" to 
which the legislators referred required employees to take the first 25% of their sick leave 
as cash—a result that is, in all substantive respects, identical to HB 213. It is clear that 
some legislators at that time recognized as much, observing plainly that the incentive they 
were promulgating required an employee to cash the first 25% of his sick leave upon 
retirement. See Audio recording: Senate Debate of S. Bill. 156, 45th Leg., Gen. Sess. 
(Mar. 4, 1983) (statement of Sen. Flamm) ("At age 65 or thereafter, 25% of the 
accumulated unused sick leave shall be converted to a cash payment." (emphasis added)); 
see also Appellee's Supp. Brief, Exhibits C, E, F, G (all requiring a 25% cashout), H and 
I (requiring a 25% cashout or 401(k) contribution). 
As a result, comments made prior to 2004 cannot support Plaintiffs' contention 
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that an employee must be able to use 100% of accrued sick leave for health insurance in 
order to effectuate the statutory purpose of Section 14.2. Indeed, if Plaintiffs' lengthy 
recitation of the statutory history of Section 14.2 proves anything, it is that for more than 
two decades, the Legislature believed that allowing employees to use 75% of their 
accumulated unused sick leave to purchase continued health insurance while requiring 
them to take the cash equivalent of the remaining 25% was, in fact, a sufficient statutory 
incentive to curb sick leave abuse. Plaintiffs cannot credibly suggest that, by providing 
essentially the same terms, HB 213 is unsupported by or contrary to that legislative 
history, or that it does not provide at least as effective an incentive for curbing sick leave 
abuse.8 
Second, even if the isolated statements of individual legislators cited by Plaintiffs 
were supportive of Plaintiffs' claims, that type of "evidence" is not particularly helpful in 
determining legislative purpose and is of minimal relevance, at best. A statute's purpose 
is generally derived from plain language of the statute, not the personal speculations of 
individual legislators. See, e.g., Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. Summit County, 2005 UT 
8
 Incidentally, for employees, like Plaintiffs, who would prefer to use all of their 
accumulated unused sick leave to purchase continued health insurance upon retirement, 
HB 213 provides a greater incentive for employees not to abuse their sick leave than any 
of the statutes in effect over the first two decades of the Program. As explained at length 
in the State's opening brief, HB 213 has been crafted in a way that will allow employees 
to use 100% of their accumulated unused sick leave to purchase continued health 
insurance, depending on when they retire and how they structure their retirement. Thus, 
at worst, Plaintiffs will receive retirement benefits under terms substantively identical to 
those in existence during the vast majority of the Program's history. At best, however, 
Plaintiffs will receive the opportunity to exchange all of their unused sick leave for the 
health insurance benefits they would prefer. 
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73, f 27, 123 P.3d 437 ("The extent to which an individual statement by a legislator is a 
reliable indicator of legislative intent has frequently been questioned."); Wood v. Univ. of 
Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, U 19, 67 P.3d 436 ("When examining a statute, we look 
first to its plain language as the best indicator of the legislature's intent and purpose in 
passing the statute. Legislators may decide that a statute should be passed for myriad, 
often even different, reasons[.]" (internal quotations and citation omitted)). It goes 
without saying that the isolated statements of various legislators, some of which were 
made over two decades ago, do not necessarily and definitively represent the collective 
intent of the legislature. See Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[T]here is 
some evidence indicating that certain legislators wanted to protect vested rights . . . [b]ut 
the language of [the statute] remains at best ambiguous, and [the court] cannot find that 
the legislature as a whole unmistakably intended to create contract rights at the time that 
service requirements were satisfied—especially where, as here, it would have been easy 
to make any such intention crystal clear"). 
Third, even if Plaintiffs were correct that the statute was enacted and maintained 
primarily in an effort to curb sick leave abuse, the fact that the statute is not a binding 
contractual guarantee does not inexorably mean, as Plaintiffs erroneously assume, that it 
cannot operate as an efficacious incentive program or that it is rendered "meaningless.1' 
Nearly all aspects of compensation and retirement benefits in the public and private 
sectors are offered as inducements to accept employment. That does not mean that those 
benefits become immutable contractual guarantees as soon as an employee begins work, 
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or that any employee can reasonably conclude that an employer will be offering the same 
benefits decades into the future when the employee eventually retires. Plaintiffs' 
fundamental assumption that only a contractual guarantee can be an effective incentive is 
simply incorrect. As one court explained in refusing to construe a statute as a contract 
that gave incentive pay to correctional officers who acquired specified educational 
credits: 
The statute merely provides that the incentive pay specified will be afforded 
if the educational qualifications are met by the employee. It does not say 
that the provisions are a contractual commitment by the state or will never 
be changed, nor is there language authorizing the state to enter into 
contracts guaranteeing such benefits forever. 
R.L Bhd ofCorr Officers v. /?./., 357 F.3d 42, 45-47, 49 (1st Cir. 2004).9 Thus, even 
assuming the legislative intent behind the enaction of the Program were to provide an 
incentive to curb sick leave abuse, it does not follow that the statute must be construed as 
a contract in order to effectuate that purpose. 
Fourth, though it is Plaintiffs' burden to establish clear and unequivocal evidence 
showing a legislative intent to create contractual rights, the evidence that does exist in this 
case shows the opposite. This is evident not only from the plain language of Section 
9
 See also R.I. Laborers' DisL Council v. R.L, 145 F.3d 42, 43-44 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(statute ''offering" salary bonuses for state employees who obtained certain college 
degrees was not a contract, even where employees had expended non-reimbursed funds 
toward obtaining degree prior to statute's amendment, because the statute did not 
explicitly promise that the bonuses would never be reduced or eliminated for clerks who 
obtained the degrees rewarded by the statute, and the use of the term "offer" was a word 
of general usage and did not alone intend to convey an unmistakable intent to create a 
binding contract). 
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14.2, explained above, but also from the fact that agency participation has been 
consistently voluntary, see Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14(2) (Supp. 1983) (agencies "may" 
offer the program to a retiring employee), and because agencies have always had the 
flexibility to withdraw from the Program altogether when budgetary constraints or other 
considerations so demand. See Personnel Management Rules and Regulations, 8.e.(4)(b) 
(1984) ("If after initially deciding to participate . . . a department decides to withdraw 
from participation for the next fiscal year, notification must be made to all employees at 
least 60 days before the new fiscal year begins."); Utah Admin. Code r.477-7-6(l) (2005) 
("If an agency decides to withdraw for the next fiscal year after initially deciding to 
participate, the agency must notify all employees at least 60 days before the new fiscal 
year begins."). That some legislators contemplated agencies would be given the freedom 
to withdraw from the Program when necessary is also evident from the comment of at 
least one legislator who observed during the 1983 debates that "[a] 11 of this [the program] 
has to be done within the existing budget. . . . The agency is going to have to look at 
whether or not they can do this in a particular year, and if they cannot do it, they will not 
do it. And, I think it's just as simple as that." Audio recording: Senate Debate of S. Bill. 
156, 45th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Swann) (emphasis added). 
This comment reinforces the view that at least some legislators, in voting to approve the 
Program, did not believe that the statute contractually bound agencies, and thereby the 
State, to its terms in perpetuity. 
Finally, interpreting Section 14.2 as giving rise to a contractually binding 
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obligation on the part of the State, simply because it offers an incentive upon which 
Plaintiffs claim to have relied, would be unwise not only for all the policy reasons and 
practical considerations previously articulated by the State, but also because such an 
interpretation could have far-reaching and unintended consequences for the public 
compensation system as a whole. Indeed, the broad interpretation Plaintiffs advocate 
could effectively render gM benefits offered to employees as inducements or incentives to 
work for the State, including ''salaries and wages, bonuses, paid leave, group insurance 
plans, retirement, and all other benefits," Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(16) (2004), 
contractual guarantees, and therefore immutable.10 Plaintiffs' proposed interpretation 
would transform public employment statutes into "ratchets, creating rights that could 
never be retraced or even modified without buying off the groups upon which the rights 
had been conferred." Proska v. Ariz. State Sck for the Deaf& the Blind, 74 P.2d 939, 
941 (Ariz. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). There is absolutely no evidence that the 
Legislature would ever have intended such a result. 
There is no question that one purpose of the Program was to reduce sick leave 
abuse. But that fact alone cannot transform the Program into a binding contractual 
10
 This interpretation would be not only contrary to the express terms of Title 49, 
which unambiguously provide that a benefit becomes unalterable only ;c[a]fter [an 
employee's] retirement date," Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-607(1), but may also have more 
far-reaching effects beyond State employees. Indeed, such an interpretation could affect 
other retirement programs overseen by the State Retirement Office, including the public 
safety, judges, higher education, public education, and local government retirement 
systems. Viewing all public employment benefits as contractual obligations could result 
in astronomical unfunded and unanticipated costs for public employers, with disastrous 
effects on the public compensation system as a whole. 
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guarantee. To reach that conclusion, Plaintiffs would need to point to clear and 
unequivocal language in the statute indicating an intent to create a contract. If there is no 
such language, or if the statute is simply ambiguous, this Court must conclude that the 
statute does not create a contract. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Plaintiffs' appeal should be denied and the district court's 
decision affirmed. 
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